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Freedom of Thought, Offensive Fantasies and                 
the Fundamental Human Right to Hold Deviant Ideas:       
Why the Seventh Circuit Got it Wrong in                       
Doe v. City of Lafayette, Indiana 
CLAY CALVERT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A precarious balance and considerable tension exists between two 
competing legal interests – the essential, First Amendment-grounded1 hu-
man right to freedom of thought,2 on the one hand, and the desire to pre-
vent harm and injury that might occur if thought is converted to action, on 
the other.  To understand this tension, it is useful to start by considering 
three different and disturbing factual scenarios. 
Scenario 1: A man recently completed a prison term for the crime of 
assault with a deadly weapon.3  He now stands outside of Madison Square 
Garden in New York City.  It is September 2, 2004.  The man is an anar-
chist with radical ideas.  More than anything else, however, he hates Presi-
dent George W. Bush, who will speak that night at Madison Square Gar-
den.4  Like many protestors outside of the Republican National Conven-
tion,5 he chants the usual down-with-Bush slogans.  However, this man 
  
    *    Associate Professor of Communications & Law and Co-Director of the Pennsylvania Center for 
the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania State University.  B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford 
University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 
1996, Communication, Stanford University.  Member, State Bar of California.  The author thanks 
Cornelius Cornelssen, Rachel Frankel and Lesley O’Connor of The Pennsylvania State University for 
their assistance that contributed to this article. 
    1.   The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that “Congress 
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”  U.S. Const. amend. I.  The 
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses have been incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and officials.  See Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  
 2. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (writing that “the right of freedom of thought 
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking at all”) (emphasis added). 
 3. See e.g. Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 245 (West 2005) (articulating the crime of assault with a deadly 
weapon). 
 4. See generally Ken Herman, Bush Promises a Safer America; Stay the Course in War on Terror, 
President Urges, Atlanta J. & Const. 1A (Sept. 3, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, ATLJNL 
file) (describing President George W. Bush’s party nomination acceptance speech at the Republican 
National Convention on September 2, 2004 at Madison Square Garden).  
 5. See generally David Zucchino, The Race To The White House; Protests Meet a Nimble NYPD; 
Police Tracked Rallies During the Republican National Convention with the Web and Bike, L.A. Times 
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also thinks about what it would be like to kill the President.  He fantasizes 
about shooting President Bush as he watches the presidential motorcade 
arrive and he sees the President step out of his car to wave to the crowd.  
But the man does not act on his fantasies.  After President Bush enters 
Madison Square Garden, the man peacefully leaves the scene and heads 
home. 
Scenario 2: A fourteen-year-old boy is often taunted by classmates at 
school because he is perceived to be a “freak.”  The boy loves to play 
video games, both at home and at an arcade a block away from his school.  
His favorite games depict graphic images of violence, much like those 
played by Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, the killers at Columbine High 
School.6  As he plays the games, he fantasizes about walking down the 
block, entering his school and killing three of his classmates who bully him 
the most.  He admires Michael Carneal, a student near Paducah, Kentucky 
who came into school one day in 1997 and opened fire on some class-
mates, killing three students.7  Although the boy has access to a gun at 
home, he never brings it to school or converts his thoughts to action.  He 
always goes home from the video arcade peacefully. 
Scenario 3: A man has “a long history of arrests and convictions for 
sexually related crimes.”8  Although now free from prison and nearly a 
decade removed from his last conviction, “he still has fantasies about chil-
dren.”9  One day, he drives to a park and watches “five youths in their early 
teens playing on a baseball diamond.”10  While watching the children, he 
thinks about having sexual contact with them.11  However, “without having 
any contact with them,”12 he leaves the park peacefully, telling himself, 
“I’ve got to get out of here before I do something.”13  The man later states 
  
A21 (Sept. 4, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, LAT file) (describing protests outside of the 
Republican National Convention). 
 6. See generally Lynn Bartels & Ann Imse, Friendly Faces Hid Kid Killers: Social, Normal Teens 
Eventually Harbored Dark, Sinister Attitudes, Rocky Mt. News (Denver, Colo.) 10A (Apr. 22, 1999) 
(available at LEXIS, News library, RMTNEW file) (describing how Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold 
“linked their home computers and for hours played violent video games”); Mitchell Zuckoff & Ellen 
O'Brien, Town, Nation Staggered by School Killings, Boston Globe (Boston, Mass.) A1 (Apr. 22, 1999) 
(describing the tragedy at Columbine High School as “one of the deadliest school attacks in US his-
tory” and noting that “[t]he two suspects, Eric D. Harris, 18, and Dylan Bennet Klebold, 17, misfits 
who dabbled in Nazi worship and other antisocial behavior, allegedly vented their shared, murderous 
anger in a midday rampage . . . that was at once viciously methodical and horribly random”). 
 7. See generally Monte Reel, Kentucky Teen-Ager Kills 3 At School; 5 Others in Prayer Group Are 
Shot in West Paducah Attack; Police Arrest 14-Year-Old Boy, St. Louis Post-Dispatch (St. Louis, Mo.) 
A1 (Dec. 2, 1997) (available at LEXIS, News library, SLPD file). 
 8. Doe v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 377 F.3d 757, 758 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 9. Id. at 774 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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in a sworn affidavit, “I certainly had sexual thoughts.  However, I was not 
planning to act on my thoughts.  I recognized that these were just un-
healthy thoughts and I realized I needed to leave the park, which is what I 
did.”14 
The first two of these three scenarios are fictitious, yet probably not 
too much of a stretch today, given both the anger and deep-seated feelings 
toward President Bush outside of the Republican National Convention and 
the school shootings across the United States that so often are blamed on 
media products like video games.15  The third scenario, involving the sex-
ual predator that somewhat sounds as if it were ripped from the lead lines 
of an aging Jethro Tull song,16 is anything but fictitious.  In fact, it gave 
rise to an important federal lawsuit, Doe v. City of Lafayette, Indiana, 
which has worked its way through the federal court system, from the dis-
trict court level17 to a three-judge appellate court18 and, finally, in July 
2004, to an en banc, 8-3 divided decision by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.19 
City of Lafayette is a unique case on the important human right of free-
dom to think.  As Kenneth J. Falk, the attorney for defendant John Doe and 
the Legal Director of the Indiana Civil Liberties Union,20 told the Washing-
ton Times, “I am unaware of any other case in the country like this.  This 
focuses on your thoughts.  Usually we don’t know what people think 
unless thought is tied to action.  It’s really unique to be banned [from 
parks] based on your thoughts.”21 
While the issue in City of Lafayette of “whether the First Amendment 
protects a citizen who goes to a venue and thinks about committing a 
crime”22 has not been addressed by most courts in the United States, its 
relevance extends far beyond the narrow confines of its facts.  Indeed, it 
would cover the first two hypotheticals set forth above, as well as any other 
  
 14. Id. 
 15. Cf. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The Irony of News Coverage: How the Media Harm 
Their Own First Amendment Rights, 24 Hastings Commun. & Ent. L.J. 215, 218 (2002) (describing 
how “a sporadic number of school shootings, such as the one in Santee, California in March 2001, have 
kept media attention and, in turn, public and legislative attention focused on the allegedly harmful 
effects of media products on youths”). 
 16. See Jethro Tull, Aqualung, in Aqualung (Reprise 1971) (L.P.) (describing an old man “[s]itting 
on a park bench eyeing little girls with bad intent . . . watching as the frilly panties run”). 
 17. 160 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ind. 2001), rev’d, 334 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 2003), aff’d on reh’g, 377 
F.3d 757 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 18. 334 F.3d 606; vacated and reh’g granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16563 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 2003). 
 19. 377 F.3d at 757 (en banc). 
 20. See Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Who We Are, http://www.iclu.org/who_we_are (accessed 
Apr. 23, 2005). 
 21. Frank J. Murray, Lifting of Ban on Sex Predator in Parks to be Appealed, Wash. Times (July 3, 
2003) (available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20030702-113116-8223r.htm). 
 22. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 778 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting). 
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scenario in which a person harbors a thought to violate a criminal statute.  
This issue extends to the driver who, when he is pulled over by a police 
officer for allegedly speeding, thinks to himself as the officer walks up to 
his car, “I’d love to kill that cop.  Why isn’t he handling a real crime?”23  It 
also applies to the husband who holds an internal monologue and fanta-
sizes about avenging the brutal rape of his wife while he watches the rapist 
in court being sentenced to only seven years in prison.  The implications of 
the issue in City of Lafayette are immense.  
As a general principle, “[p]eople don’t get arrested for what they write 
or what they think.  They get arrested for what they do.”24  The holding in 
City of Lafayette, when taken to its logical–perhaps, from the dissent’s 
perspective, illogical–conclusion, suggests that this maxim may no longer 
hold true.  While it may have been clear in the past that one could think 
about supporting terrorist groups like al-Qaida and their criminal activities 
without running afoul of the law, this may no longer be the case.25  The 
notion of an Orwellian thought-crime26 may indeed cross the minds of 
some readers of the 2004 opinion in City of Lafayette. 
This article examines and critiques the majority opinion of the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in City of Lafayette.27  The majority held that the 
  
 23. To further show the problem illustrated by this example, one must understand and remember 
that Tupac Shakur’s songs called “Soulja’s Story” and “Crooked Ass Nigga,” both of which express 
criminal sentiments about killing police officers, are fully protected by the First Amendment as free 
speech.  It would be ironic and nonsensical, then, if speech about killing the police were protected by 
the First Amendment but thoughts about killing the police were not so sheltered.  See Davidson v. Time 
Warner, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559 at **5, 71-72 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 1997) (writing that 
“although the Court cannot recommend 2Pacalypse Now to anyone, it will not strip Shakur’s free 
speech rights,” and adding that “the First Amendment became part of the Constitution because the 
Crown sought to suppress the Framers' own rebellious, sometimes violent views”); Tupac Shakur, 
Soulja's Story, in 2Pacalyse Now (Interscope Records 1991) (CD) (“Cops on my tail, so I bail till I 
dodge ‘em.  They finally pull me over and I laugh.  Remember Rodney King, and I blast on his punk 
ass.”). 
 24. Sean Kelly, Arrest Not Tied to Article, Denver Post B-02 (June 2, 2004) (available at LEXIS, 
News library, DPOST file) (quoting Bob Grant, a district attorney for the Colorado counties of Broom-
field and Adams). 
 25. In sentencing Mukhtar al-Bakri to ten years in federal prison in December 2003 for aiding al-
Qaida by training with the terrorist organization in Afghanistan, U.S. District Judge William M. 
Skretny stated: “You are not being punished for what you think, or because of the possibility that you 
may be dangerous.  You are being punished because you knowingly and willfully engaged in conduct 
that is contrary to the laws of the United States.”  Dan Herbeck, 10 Years for First of Six, Buffalo News 
(Buffalo, N.Y.) A1 (Dec. 4, 2003) (available at LEXIS, News library, BUFNEW file).  As Judge 
Skretny’s comments suggest, there traditionally has been a marked difference between thoughts and 
conduct in the law. 
 26. See generally Rene Sanchez, Librarians Make Some Noise Over Patriot Act; Concerns About 
Privacy Prompt Some to Warn Patrons, Destroy Records of Book and Computer, Wash. Post A20 
(Apr. 10, 2003) (available at LEXIS, News library, WPOST file) (describing how author George Or-
well’s now half-century old book, 1984, “depicts a world in which an all-powerful government known 
as ‘Big Brother’ meddles in citizens' private lives and punishes them even for thought crimes”).  
 27. 377 F.3d 757. 
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city’s ban of John Doe, a convicted sex offender, from its parks because he 
once fantasized about molesting children while watching them play in the 
park does not violate the First Amendment right to freedom of thought.28  
The July 2004 en banc opinion reversed the result of an earlier vacated 
decision by a three-judge panel of the same court just thirteen months be-
fore.29  The panel held that the park ban violated the unenumerated consti-
tutional right of freedom of thought.30  The two judges who voted in favor 
of John Doe the first time the appellate court heard the case, Judge Ann 
Claire Williams31 and Judge Diane Pamela Wood,32 suddenly found them-
selves in a three-judge minority, along with Judge Ilana Diamond Rov-
ner,33 in July 2004.  They faced an eight-judge majority that included the 
prominent and powerful Richard Posner.34  However, as this article dem-
onstrates, there is much more to this case that is interesting and unusual 
than the counterintuitive nature of the gender breakdown of the jurists.  
The three female jurists were the only appellate court judges to take the 
side of a convicted male sex offender, while all eight male judges in the en 
banc proceeding ruled against Doe.35 
  
 28. See id. at 767 (“The First Amendment does not prohibit the City from taking the action it did to 
protect its children.  It does not require the City to act in an ostrichlike fashion and expose the children 
of the City to the risk that, on a future date, a child will wander further from the group, present a better 
opportunity and experience tragic consequences.”). 
 29. Doe, 334 F.3d 606. 
 30. Id. at 606. 
 31. Judge Williams, who was born in 1949 in Detroit, Michigan, has served on the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals since 1999 after being nominated by President Bill Clinton.  See Federal Judicial 
Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=2591 (accessed 
Apr. 23, 2005). 
 32. Judge Wood, who was born in 1950 in Plainfield, New Jersey, has served on the Seventh Circuit 
since 1995 after she was nominated by President Bill Clinton.  She once was a clerk for former United 
States Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun.  See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United 
States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/uGetInfo?jid=2636 (accessed Apr. 23, 2005). 
 33. Judge Rovner, who was born in 1938 in Riga, Latvia, has served on the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals since 1992 after she was nominated by President George H. W. Bush.  See Federal Judicial 
Center, Judges of the United States Courts, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/uGetInfo?jid=2066 (accessed 
Apr. 23, 2005). 
 34. For purposes of full disclosure and to demonstrate objectivity, the author of this article has 
lauded the work of Judge Posner on another First Amendment case involving a very different issue, but 
this time the author rejects the reasoning of the majority opinion in City of Lafayette in which Judge 
Posner joined.  See Clay Calvert, Violence, Video Games, and A Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the 
Defense of Kids’ Culture and the First Amendment, 39 San Diego L. Rev. 1 (2002) (praising Judge 
Posner’s opinion protecting the free speech rights of minors to play video games depicting violent 
images in Am. Amus. Mach. Assn. v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 
(2001)). 
 35. The eight-judge, all-male majority was comprised of Chief Judge Joel Martin Flaum and Circuit 
Judges Richard Allen Posner, John Louis Coffey, Frank Hoover Easterbrook, Kenneth Francis Ripple, 
Daniel Anthony Manion, Michael Stephen Kanne and Terence Thomas Evans.  See City of Lafayette, 
377 F.3d at 757-58 (listing the judges taking part in the decision and identifying those who dissented 
from the rest); see Federal Judicial Center, Courts of the Federal Judiciary, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet 
/tGetCourt?cid=23&order=a (accessed Apr. 23, 2005). 
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This decision has also become somewhat of a political litmus test for 
politicians in Indiana.  As the Associated Press reported shortly after the 
Seventh Circuit handed down its decision, “[t]wo candidates who want to 
represent Lafayette in the Indiana House praised a federal court ruling bar-
ring a convicted child molester from city parks but said a statewide version 
of the ban is needed.”36  To put that into context, a decision from the judi-
ciary rejecting a constitutional right to freedom of thought now has re-
sulted in calls for the legislative branch to essentially codify that ruling.  
Joe Micon, the Democratic candidate, explicitly stated his willingness to 
change the constitution when he professed, “I would be supportive of legis-
lation.”37 
What candidate, of course, would not want to pander to parents and 
support such legislation?  It is easy to run for office and to support legisla-
tion when it is strategically and narrowly framed,38 such as the concise and 
visceral frame of “protect children from a pedophile” rather than the more 
complex and less emotionally appealing frame of “protect a constitutional 
right from legislative usurpation.”39  In justifying his mission to ban John 
Doe from Lafayette’s parks, David Heath, mayor of Lafayette, Indiana, 
stated “parks are for children and parks are for families.  Families should 
be able to send their children to our parks, knowing that they are not . . . 
being window shopped by a sexual predator.”40 
Ironically, Heath’s statement reveals the defect in his city’s decision to 
ban John Doe from its parks.  Window shopping means just that – looking 
in and peering from the outside.  There is a major difference between look-
ing and conduct.  Doe merely watched; he did not engage in any conduct. 
Part II of this article provides background on the right to freedom of 
thought, including a discussion of recent United States Supreme Court 
analysis on this right.  Part III then describes, analyzes, and critiques the 
Seventh Circuit’s 2004 en banc opinion holding that the City of Lafayette 
  
 36. Associated Press, House Candidates Say Molester Ban Should Be Taken Statewide, Associated 
Press Newswires (July 31, 2004) (available at WL, APWIRESPLUS database). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Framing is used here to refer to the rhetorical strategies, including such things as choice of 
words and what facts to include and exclude, that are used in describing an event and that make salient 
some issues surrounding the event while suppressing others, which, in turn, impacts how we think 
about, understand and process the event in question.  See generally Joseph N. Cappella & Kathleen 
Hall Jamieson, Spiral of Cynicism: The Press and the Public Good 38-48 (Oxford U. Press 1997) 
(discussing the concept of framing within the field of journalism). 
 39. The framing of the issue by politicians as one about protecting children rather than one about 
protecting a constitutional right became clear in July 2003 when David Heath, the mayor of Lafayette, 
Indiana, told a national television audience on The O’Reilly Factor that “what we were trying to do is 
very simple, and that’s protect children.”  The O’Reilly Factor (Fox Broad. Co. July 2, 2003) (TV 
broadcast). 
 40. Id. 
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did not violate John Doe’s right to freedom of thought.  Importantly, Part 
III contends there are at least four separate reasons, each grounded in First 
Amendment jurisprudence tied to freedom of expression, why the majority 
erred in its conclusion.  These reasons go far beyond those articulated in 
the dissenting opinion in City of Lafayette and thus suggest new and addi-
tional rationales for reversal.  Next, Part IV demonstrates the dangerous-
ness of the precedent set by the majority’s reasoning as it might apply to 
other scenarios, including the first two hypothetical fact patterns laid out at 
the beginning of this article.  Finally, the article concludes in Part V that 
the United States Supreme Court should accept certiorari in this case and 
reverse the Seventh Circuit’s decision. 
II.  FREEDOM OF THOUGHT: OF PRECEDENT AND IMPORTANCE 
More than a decade ago, First Amendment scholar Rodney A. Smolla 
described what he called “the inviolable primacy of freedom of thought.”41  
Smolla, now Dean of the University of Richmond’s T.C. Williams School 
of Law, posed the following question: 
[W]ho would defend the prerogative of the state to censor thought?  
Only by accepting that man is a creature of the state and that even 
the intimate internal processes of mind that distinguish human ex-
istence are enjoyed at the state’s sufferance could such a mon-
strous and awesome intrusion be justified.  To accept the proposi-
tion would be to accept the extinction of thousands of years of 
moral evolution, in which the world has come slowly and painfully 
to recognize that men possess certain entitlements to dignity and 
autonomy by sheer virtue of their humanity.42 
Freedom of thought, in other words, is an important moral principle, 
not simply a legal one, that is linked to autonomy and individualism.43  
And although a federal court recently observed that “the constitutional 
basis for the protection of freedom of thought has never been fully clari-
fied,” it is a concept that “undeniably finds its root in the First Amend-
ment, and is undeniably protected,” prized and privileged by the United 
  
 41. Rodney A. Smolla, Freedom in an Open Society 11 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1992). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Robert N. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American 
Life 142 (U. of Cal. Press 1985) (writing that “[w]e believe in the dignity, indeed the sacredness, of the 
individual.  Anything that would violate our right to think for ourselves, judge for ourselves, make our 
own decisions, live our lives as we see fit, is not only morally wrong, it is sacrilegious”) (emphasis 
added). 
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States Supreme Court as integral to a democratic society.44  As the late 
Justice Felix Frankfurter once wrote, “without freedom of thought there 
can be no free society.”45 
Since Justice Frankfurter’s statement more than half a century ago, 
freedom of thought has received renewed and reinvigorated interest from 
the nation’s high court, particularly in the past three years.  For instance, in 
declaring unconstitutional a Texas anti-sodomy statute, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy wrote in 2003 for the majority of the Court that “[l]iberty pre-
sumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expres-
sion, and certain intimate conduct.”46  For Justice Kennedy, the concept of 
freedom of thought was closely linked to one of the “more transcendent 
dimensions” of human liberty and privacy.47 
Just one year prior, in striking down on First Amendment grounds of 
overbreadth48 a federal law criminalizing virtual images that appeared to be 
of minors engaged in sexual conduct,49 Justice Kennedy wrote for the 
Court, stating:  
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the govern-
ment seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that imper-
missible end.  The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and 
speech must be protected from the government because speech is 
the beginning of thought.50 
Importantly, Kennedy’s words came in the context of a case that, like City 
of Lafayette, focused on the dangers of sexual predators that prey on chil-
dren.  In particular, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the federal gov-
ernment argued that the Child Pornography Prevention Act was justified, 
in part, because “virtual child pornography whets the appetites of pedo-
philes and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct.”51 
In rejecting this argument, Kennedy wrote that “[t]he mere tendency of 
speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning 
  
 44. Vaughn v. Lawrenceburg Power Sys., 269 F.3d 703, 717 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 45. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 46. Lawrence v. Tex., 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 47. Id. 
 48. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 912 (2d ed., Aspen Law & 
Bus. 2002) (“A law is unconstitutionally overbroad if it regulates substantially more speech than the 
Constitution allows to be regulated and a person to whom the law constitutionally can be applied can 
argue that it would be unconstitutional as applied to others.”). 
 49. The law at issue was the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 
(2000), which made it a crime to possess and distribute images that merely appeared to be of minors 
engaging in sexual conduct even though no actual children were used in the production or creation of 
the images. 
 50. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (emphasis added). 
 51. Id. 
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it.”52  The same thing, of course, might be said for thoughts – that the mere 
tendency of one’s thoughts to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient 
reason for banning them.  Kennedy buttressed this position by quoting 
from the Court’s opinion on the private possession of obscene material53 in 
Stanley v. Georgia.54  Justice Kennedy noted that Stanley stood for the 
proposition that government authorities “cannot constitutionally premise 
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s private thoughts.”55 
Significantly, Kennedy observed that “the Court’s First Amendment 
cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds, between ideas and 
conduct.”56  It is this latter dichotomy that is so pivotal in the City of La-
fayette case, given John Doe’s failure to take any action on his thoughts 
beyond simply sitting in a park and watching children play.  Kennedy 
wrote that, with regard to the Child Pornography Prevention Act, “there is 
here no attempt, incitement, solicitation, or conspiracy.”57  Likewise, John 
Doe made no attempt to molest children playing in a park; he merely 
thought about it, controlled his thoughts and impulses, and left. 
Kennedy and the majority thus were able to declare the Child Pornog-
raphy Prevention Act unconstitutional despite the twin recognitions that 
pedophiles “flirt with . . . impulses” to molest children and that “sexual 
abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral 
instincts of a decent people.”58  Parsed differently, Kennedy and the major-
ity were able to distinguish their own beliefs and feelings about the repul-
sive subject matter at issue from their legal analysis.  However, as this arti-
cle argues in Part III, the majority of the Seventh Circuit in City of Lafay-
ette may have been unable to separate its disgust and revulsion with John 
Doe’s prior actions and his present thoughts from its legal analysis of the 
case.  While one can surely sympathize with the majority for not providing 
John Doe with what might be considered “the right to think the unthink-
able,”59 and while one can, reasonably see the need to sacrifice individual 
autonomy for societal safety, the majority’s opinion nonetheless is flawed. 
Given the fact that John Doe’s fantasies involved the molestation of 
children, it is important to note that at least one scholar believes that, in the 
  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 247 (citing Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).  Miller set forth the Supreme Court’s 
current test for obscenity. 
 54. Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557 (1969). 
 55. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253 (quoting Stanley, 394 U.S. at 566). 
 56. Id. at 253 (emphasis added). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 244-45. 
 59. This phrase is borrowed from a very different context where the right to think is cherished 
perhaps more than any other – higher education.  See Report of the Committee on Freedom of Expres-
sion at Yale, 4 Human Rights 357, 357 (Summer 1975). 
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United States, child pornography–a type of content often linked in the 
minds of many to the molestation of minors by pedophiles60–already “has 
become a thought crime.”61  Amy Adler, an associate professor of law at 
New York University, wrote in a recent law review article: 
[O]nce our interpretation depends on the pedophile’s imagined re-
sponse to the picture, we have begun to police thoughts and fan-
tasy, not actions.  The harm of the pictures no longer turns on what 
happened to the child.  It now occurs in the possibility of seeing a 
picture in a certain way, in how someone might perceive the child.  
The determination of whether a picture is child pornography has 
grown increasingly bound up in our projections of whether these 
pictures will permit pedophiles to fantasize about them.  Thus, 
child pornography law has begun to police speech based on how 
people may respond to it.  This is in direct contravention of tradi-
tional First Amendment tenets.62 
Of particular concern here for Professor Adler is the test under federal 
law for determining whether certain images of minors depict a “lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.”63  Such an exhibition involving a 
minor is deemed to constitute sexually explicit conduct forbidden by the 
Child Pornography Prevention Act.64  In ferreting out whether such an ex-
hibition exists, at least one federal appellate court has held that the key is 
the “appeal to the lascivious interest of an audience of pedophiles.”65  An-
other federal appellate court has said that whether an image is lascivious is 
determined, in part, by whether an image is “presented by the photographer 
as to arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of a voyeur.”66  Under such an 
approach which focuses on a pedophile-viewer’s reaction, “a deviant’s 
subjective response could turn innocuous images into pornography.”67  For 
Adler, such a definition of child pornography–one that centers on the nexus 
  
 60. See e.g. R. Barri Flowers, The Sex Trade Industry’s Worldwide Exploitation of Children, 575 
Annals of the Am. Acad. of Political & Soc. Sci. 147, 152 (May 2001) (writing that “[t]he consumers 
of child pornography are predominantly male child molesters, pedophiles, and others with an abnormal 
sexual interest in children”); Tim Tate, The Child Pornography Industry: International Trade in Child 
Sexual Abuse in Pornography: Women, Violence & Civil Liberties 203, 211-13 (Catherine Itzen ed., 
Oxford U. Press 1992) (describing “the new breed of child pornographers: abusers who produced their 
own material” and observing “the fundamental relationship between paedophilia [sic] and child por-
nography”). 
 61. Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 921, 995 (2001). 
 62. Id. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (defining “sexually explicit conduct” to include “lascivious exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area of any person”); Adler, supra n. 61, at 946-47. 
 64. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260. 
 65. U.S. v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 747 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 66. U.S. v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 67. U.S. v. Amirault, 173 F.3d 28, 34 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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between images and thoughts–is tantamount to a thought crime because it 
pivots on the fact that “we do not like the way people think about certain 
pictures of children.”68  She adds that “[t]he law demands that we examine 
pictures to determine how a pedophile would see them; we then criminal-
ize these pictures, or not, depending on that viewpoint.”69 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Free Speech Coalition, handed down 
just one year after the publication of Professor Adler’s article, does little to 
mitigate her concerns.  Free Speech Coalition focused solely on virtual 
images of child pornography in the context of the Child Pornography Pre-
vention Act of 1996.  The opinion did not address or disturb in any way 
how courts interpret the meaning of the phrase “lascivious exhibition” 
which is based on how a pedophile thinks about an image or photograph. 
It is worth noting here that John Doe, the convicted pedophile at the 
center of the City of Lafayette case, also was thinking about an image, al-
beit a real-life image of children playing, rather than one captured by a 
camera.  He simultaneously converted this image into a perverted fantasy, 
which got him in trouble with officials in Lafayette, Indiana.  Adler’s con-
cern that child pornography is a thought crime thus might provide the legal 
bridge that allowed the majority in City of Lafayette to connect thoughts 
and punishment. 
Seventy-five years before Free Speech Coalition, Justice Louis 
Brandeis wrote in 1927 that those who won our independence in the United 
States “believed that the freedom to think as you will and to speak as you 
think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political 
truth.”70  Of course, John Doe clearly was not seeking to discover or spread 
some indispensable political truth while he was sitting and thinking in a 
City of Lafayette park.  In other words, his thoughts were not the type of 
requisite precursors to valuable speech that Justice Brandeis envisioned 
protecting.  Indeed, Doe’s thoughts were prurient and deviant.  Yet, as this 
article argues in Part III, the First Amendment protection of speech today 
shelters many forms of thoroughly low-brow expressive content, not sim-
ply uplifting political expression.  The First Amendment, in turn, should 
protect decidedly non-intellectual and offensive thoughts, provided they do 
not manifest themselves in either criminal conduct (in which case the con-
duct, not the thoughts, is illegal) or in one of those limited categories of 
expression that falls outside the scope of constitutional protection, such as 
true threat of violence and obscenity.71 
  
 68. Adler, supra n. 61, at 995 (emphasis added). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Whitney v. Cal., 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 71. The categories of unprotected speech include child pornography involving real children, N.Y. v. 
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64, (1982); imminent incitement to violence and unlawful conduct, Bran-
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Taken collectively, all of the rather grandiose statements quoted above, 
both old and new, suggest that freedom of thought both deserves and re-
ceives absolute protection as an unenumerated right under the First 
Amendment.  But in July 2004, a fractured United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit issued an en banc opinion that makes it clear that 
there are limits on freedom of thought. 
III.  THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE AND THE NEED TO PROTECT IT 
When a person transforms his deviant sexual thoughts about children 
into deviant writings about them, he moves from the realm of thought to 
the realm of speech, and he risks punishment and prosecution.  For in-
stance, an Ohio man named Brian Dalton pleaded guilty and was sentenced 
to seven years in prison in 2001 “for creating and possessing a personal 
diary containing violent sexual fantasies involving children.”72  The deci-
sion,73 along with the statute on which it was based,74 was roundly criti-
cized by many, including Harvard Law School Professor Laurence Tribe, 
who called it “as close as you can get to creating a thought crime.”75 
Tribe’s comments would prove prophetic in March 2004 when Judge 
David E. Cain held that Dalton, who had by that time spent eighteen 
months in prison, was wrongly convicted and could not be tried again.76  
Judge Cain opined that “[t]he defendant’s thoughts, no matter how hide-
ous, were still just that – thoughts, the pathetic products of a sick imagina-
tion.”77  The judge added that while the State of Ohio was correctly con-
cerned that Dalton, who had a previous conviction for possession of child 
pornography when the diary was found, might re-offend, “the judicial 
branch of government must resist the temptation to engage in pre-emptive 
strikes.”78  Prosecutors had argued to Judge Cain at a previous hearing that 
  
denburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); true threats, Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705, (1969) (per cu-
riam); obscenity, Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, 483-85 (1957); some forms of libel, Beauharnais v. Ill., 
343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952); and fighting words, Chaplinsky v. N.H. 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942). 
 72. Matthew Sostrin, Private Writings and the First Amendment: The Case of Brian Dalton, 2003 U. 
Ill. L. Rev. 887, 887 (2003). 
 73. See State v. Dalton, 793 N.E.2d 509 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. 2003) (describing the conviction of 
Brian Dalton, but also determining that he was provided with such ineffective assistance of counsel 
such that Dalton’s guilty plea should have been withdrawn). 
 74. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.321 (West 2003). 
 75. Sostrin, supra n. 72, at 888 (citing Kevin Peraino, A Seven-Year Sentence for a Diary, News-
week 36 (July 30, 2001) (available at 2001 WL 19505065) (quoting Professor Laurence Tribe)). 
 76. Good Riddance; Judge Is Right to Halt Case of Man Tried for Deviant Thoughts, Columbus 
Dispatch (Columbus, Ohio) 6A (Mar. 9, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, COLDIS file). 
 77. Id. 
 78. Kevin Mayhood, State Can’t Retry Author of Child Porn, Columbus Dispatch (Columbus, Ohio) 
1A (Mar. 5, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, COLDIS file). 
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Dalton was dangerous because he “literally mulls over the idea of sex with 
children when he sees them on the street.”79 
Just four months after Judge Cain’s well-reasoned March 2004 deci-
sion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit issued an 
opinion in July 2004 allowing Lafayette, Indiana to make such a pre-
emptive strike against a man known as John Doe.  Doe, like Dalton, mulled 
the idea of having sex with children when he saw them.  While Dalton 
once may have been, as his attorney put it, “the only person in America 
serving time for writing down his thoughts in a personal diary,”80 today 
John Doe is the only man in America banned from public parks simply 
because of his thoughts.  Thoughts that, unlike Dalton, he never even wrote 
down. 
How can it be, then, that a federal appellate court, one including 
prominent jurists such as Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, allowed a 
man’s freedom of movement to be restricted because of his deviant 
thoughts?  As this Part makes clear, the answer is his freedom of move-
ment hinged on his freedom of thought. 
A. “If You Can Take a Man’s Life for the Thoughts That’s in His Head”81 
Banning a man from a public park for his thoughts is a far cry from 
taking away his life, but the principles of freedom of thought suggest that 
neither punishment is warranted.  Yet, it was the former prohibition that 
divided the members of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in July 2004 
in Doe v. City of Lafayette.  While the judges on the Seventh Circuit ulti-
mately parted ways on the outcome of the case, there certainly was at least 
one matter on which they all agreed.  The man known as John Doe, who is 
now in his late 40s,82 is anything but a model citizen, regardless of his 
“above-average intelligence and the bachelor’s degree in management he 
earned from Purdue University in the late 1970s.”83  As Judge Williams 
  
 79. Jeb Phillips, Sex-Diary Writer Expected to Leave Jail, Columbus Dispatch (Columbus, Ohio) 
12B (Sept. 16, 2003) (available at LEXIS, News library, COLDIS file). 
 80. Tim Doulin, Diary Writer Seeks Dismissal of '01 Conviction; Lawyers Say Obscenity Plea 
Flawed, Columbus Dispatch (Columbus, Ohio) 6C (Apr. 9, 2003) (available at LEXIS, News library, 
COLDIS file). 
 81. Bruce Springsteen, Johnny 99, in Nebraska (Columbia Records 1982) (CD) (singing from the 
perspective of a man just sentenced to ninety-nine years in prison “if you can take a man’s life for the 
thoughts that’s in his head [t]hen won’t you sit back in that chair and think it over judge one more time 
[a]nd let ‘em shave off my hair and put me on that execution line”). 
 82. See Joe Gerrety, Park Ban Sparks Lawsuit, Debate Over Sex Offenders, J. & Courier (Lafayette, 
Ind.) 18A (Apr. 4, 2004) (available at LEXIS, News library, JNLCOU file) (describing Doe as “now in 
his late 40s”). 
 83. Joe Gerrety, ‘Paying for Being Honest,’ J. & Courier (Lafayette, Ind.) 8A (Apr. 4, 2004) (avail-
able at LEXIS, News library, JNLCOU file). 
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wrote for the dissent, Doe’s “criminal history includes convictions for 
child molestation, voyeurism, exhibitionism, and window peeping,” and he 
“has been hospitalized, imprisoned, under house arrest, and on proba-
tion.”84  The dissent, which ruled in favor of Doe’s right to freedom of 
thought, even called the content of those thoughts “repugnant and deplor-
able.”85  Doe, in common parlance, would probably be considered a per-
vert.  As Judge Ripple wrote for the majority, Doe once “went into a locker 
room at a local school, pulled down the swimsuit of a ten-year-old boy and 
performed oral sex on him.  The next year, Mr. Doe forcibly performed 
oral sex on a twelve-year-old boy.”86 
In January 2000, when the incident that gave rise to the dispute in City 
of Lafayette occurred however, it had been nine years since Doe’s last con-
viction87 and he was not on probation at the time.88  Ultimately, what oc-
curred on a Saturday evening in early January 2000 in a park in Lafayette, 
Indiana would send Doe’s life back into darkness.  Perhaps more impor-
tantly, it would also give rise to a set of facts that tests just how far the 
judiciary is willing to stretch and extend the unenumerated constitutional 
right of freedom of thought when the thoughts in question relate to com-
mitting one of the most heinous of crimes – child molestation. 
Doe’s own words, taken under oath in a deposition, describing the 
events (and thoughts) of that night are both clear and chilling.  Doe was “in 
the mood of cruising” and went looking “mostly” for children in Murdock 
Park,89 a 39-acre park, featuring “[p]laygrounds, disc golf course, sled run, 
basketball court, lighted softball field, 0.9 mile interpretive trail, picnic 
areas and grills.”90 
For the attorney defending the City of Lafayette in the lawsuit that Doe 
would later file against it in November 2000, it allegedly was the conduct 
by Doe of driving to a park with playgrounds and a ball field, and looking 
for children, rather than any thoughts that caused him to be banned from 
city parks.  As attorney Jerry Withered told the members of the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in January 2004 during oral argument for the city, 
“Mr. Doe was not banned from the Lafayette city parks for what he 
thought.  He was banned for what he did.  He’s in the park, and before he 
  
 84. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 774 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 784. 
 86. Id. at 758 (majority). 
 87. Id. at 774 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting) (writing that Doe’s “last conviction was 
in 1991, ten years before this litigation”). 
 88. Id. at 774, n. 4 (“Doe was not on probation in January 2000 and was not even restricted from 
entering the park during his period of house arrest a decade earlier.”). 
 89. Id. at 759 (majority).  
 90. See Lafayette-West Lafayette Convention & Visitors Bureau, Recreation, http://www.lafayette   
-in.com/recreation.html (accessed Apr. 23, 2005). 
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got to the park, he’s cruising around looking for children.”91  Doe’s attor-
ney countered that “[t]he city is saying because of what is in your mind, 
and the fact that it is in your mind while you are near children, we can ban 
you.”92 
What precisely was John Doe thinking about in the park?  When asked 
that question during a deposition in the case, Doe stated the following: 
When I saw the three, the four kids there, my thoughts were 
thoughts I had before when I see children, possibly expose myself 
to them, I thought about the possibility of, you know, having some 
kind of sexual contact with the kids, but I know with four kids 
there, that’s pretty difficult to do.  It’s a wide open area.  Those 
thoughts were there, but they, you know, weren’t realistic at the 
time.  They were just thoughts.93 
He watched the children for 15-30 minutes, and without having any 
contact with them, left the park.94  Doe also stated in the deposition that he 
said “to [him]self:  I’ve got to get out of here before I do something, so I 
left.”95  He added in an affidavit, “I was not planning to act on my 
thoughts.  I recognized that these were just unhealthy thoughts and I real-
ized I needed to leave the park, which is what I did.”96  Doe did in fact 
leave peacefully and the city “did not receive any complaints from the 
children in the park.”97 
At this stage, no one else knew what Doe had been thinking while he 
was watching the children play in Murdock Park.  But this would soon 
change when he transformed his thoughts into speech.  Shortly after leav-
ing the park, Doe paged his psychologist and “explained what occurred and 
expressed that he was upset about the incident.  As part of his treatment, 
his psychologist suggested that he discuss the incident with his Sexual Ad-
dicts Anonymous (SAA) group, which was to meet a few days later.”98  
The sad irony is that his remarks to the group about his thoughts would not 
remain anonymous.  Indeed, Doe recently told a reporter for the local paper 
in Lafayette, Indiana, that he “suspects that someone in the group tipped 
his former probation officer, which led to officials banning him from the 
  
 91. Joe Gerrety, Parks Ban Arguments Heard, J. & Courier (Lafayette, Ind.) 16A (Jan. 10, 2004) 
(available at LEXIS, News library, JNLCOU file). 
 92. Id. 
 93. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 760 (emphasis added). 
 94. Id. at 774 (Williams, Rovner & Wood, JJ., dissenting). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 774, n 2. 
 97. Id. at 779. 
 98. Id. at 775 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
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parks.”99  Thus, Doe was punished for trying to do the right thing – seeking 
help at a group therapy session.  As Doe himself noted in a 2004 interview, 
“I did the right thing by leaving [the park].  I did the right thing by calling 
my therapist that night.  I did the right thing by telling my group the next 
night.  I’ve been paying for that for the past four years – paying for being 
honest.”100  Judge Williams translated this paradox into legal terms, writing 
for the dissent that “[t]he First Amendment’s concern with freedom of 
thought as a basis for the freedom of expression is highlighted by the facts 
of this case.  The chilling effect of this ruling, i.e., that the communication 
of one’s thoughts may result in being banned from public spaces, is fright-
ening.”101 
In early February of 2000, Doe received letters from Lafayette, Indiana 
officials notifying him that he was banned both from all of the city’s parks 
and from all of the city’s school grounds.102  Doe did not contest the school 
ban but he objected to the park prohibition because he wanted to go there 
to play softball, watch little league games, and walk with friends.103  He 
filed a lawsuit in federal court against the City of Lafayette in November 
2000104 contending, among other things, that the city was “punishing him 
for his private thoughts.”105 
B. Thoughts, Actions, and the Notion of Psychiatric Brinkmanship 
The key to understanding why the majority ruled in favor of the City of 
Lafayette while the dissent ruled against it is found in one critical differ-
ence in their interpretation and understanding of the facts.  That difference 
pivots on a fundamental dichotomy between thought and action.  Simply 
put, the majority believed John Doe was banned from parks because of his 
actions and conduct – not because of his thoughts and fantasies – on that 
day in January 2000.106  As Judge Ripple wrote for the majority: 
The City has not banned him from having sexual fantasies about 
children.  It did not ban him from the public parks because he ad-
mitted to having sexual fantasies about children in his home or 
even in a coffee shop.  The inescapable reality is that Mr. Doe did 
not simply entertain thoughts; he brought himself to the brink of 
  
 99. Joe Gerrety, Paying for Being Honest, J. & Courier (Lafayette, Ind.) 8A (Apr. 4, 2004). 
 100. Id. 
 101. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 784 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. at 760 (majority). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 758. 
 105. Id. at 765. 
 106. Id. at 766-67. 
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committing child molestation.  He had sexual urges directed to-
ward children, and he took dangerous steps toward gratifying his 
urges by going to a place where he was likely to find children in a 
vulnerable situation.107 
By focusing on Doe’s “conduct in going to the park in search of chil-
dren to satisfy his deviant desires,”108 the majority was able to give short 
shrift to the First Amendment concerns of freedom of thought.  The major-
ity opined that “[t]he First Amendment’s freedom of mind principle does 
not subject every conduct-focused regulation to First Amendment scrutiny; 
rather, it only prohibits those regulations aimed at pure thought and thus 
mind control.”109  For the majority, it was the act of intentionally driving to 
the park to look for children–conduct the majority described as “psychiat-
ric brinkmanship”110–that moved the case out of the realm of pure thought 
and into the arena of conduct. 
Such judicial sleight of hand and fixation on conduct is not unusual 
among jurists in First Amendment cases when the speech in question is 
repugnant or deeply offensive.  For instance, the United States Supreme 
Court faced the issue in 1971 of whether the First Amendment protected a 
man’s right to wear, in a Los Angeles courthouse, a jacket emblazoned 
with the words “Fuck the Draft.”111  While the majority of the Court ruled 
in favor of Paul Robert Cohen and found that his case was about the First 
Amendment right of free speech,112 the dissent held that the case involved 
“mainly conduct and little speech.”113  The dissent thus wrote in Cohen that 
“agonizing over First Amendment values seems misplaced and unneces-
sary.”114  Importantly, the logic that the case was about conduct rather than 
speech allowed Justice Hugo Black, a free speech absolutist,115 to side with 
the minority and not protect Cohen’s jacket.116 
  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 764. 
 109. Id. at 765 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. at 762. 
 111. Cohen v. Cal, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 112. Id. at 18 (writing that Cohen’s “conviction quite clearly rests upon the asserted offensiveness of 
the words Cohen used to convey his message to the public.  The only ‘conduct’ which the State sought 
to punish is the fact of communication.  Thus, we deal here with a conviction resting solely upon 
‘speech.’ ”). 
 113. Id. at 27 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See generally Don R. Pember & Clay Calvert, Mass Media Law 43 (14th ed., McGraw Hill 
2005) (describing the absolutist theory of free speech in which “[t]he government cannot censor the 
press for any reason.  There are no exceptions.”). 
 116. See John Zelezny, Communications Law: Liberties, Restraints, and the Modern Media 59 (4th 
ed., Wadsworth 2003) (writing that Justice Hugo Black “argued for some form of absolutist approach 
to interpretation of the First Amendment,” but noting that “Black interpreted his absolutism narrowly, 
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The justices in Cohen thus divided themselves along the lines of a 
speech-versus-conduct dichotomy.  Similarly, the judges in City of Lafay-
ette divided themselves along a thought-versus-conduct dichotomy.  While 
the majority of the Seventh Circuit found the ban of John Doe to be based 
on conduct, the three dissenting judges squarely disagreed.  Judge Wil-
liams wrote for the dissent that it was “clear on this record, that absent 
Doe’s thoughts . . . the City would be uninterested in Doe’s decision to go 
to the park that fateful day.”117  This had to have been the case because, as 
Williams added, “the City acknowledges that Doe’s own revelation of his 
thoughts, not any outward expression demonstrating his thinking, is the 
basis for its actions.”118 
Judge Williams concluded that “going to the park does not rise to the 
level of an ‘action’ of sufficient gravity to justify punishment.”119  He rea-
soned, by way of example: 
In the same way that the individual with a history of robbing banks 
could not be charged with attempted bank robbery for standing 
across the street from the bank and thinking about robbing it, Doe 
may not be punished for merely thinking perverted thoughts about 
children.120 
Adding another example to illustrate her point, Judge Williams wrote 
that “punishing a drug addict who stands outside a dealer’s house craving a 
hit but successfully resists the urge to enter and purchase drugs would be 
offensive to our understanding of the bounds of the criminal law.”121 
Because the majority and dissent disagreed on whether the case piv-
oted on John Doe’s conduct or John Doe’s thoughts, both sides framed the 
issues and interests at stake in different fashions.  The majority framed the 
case as one about protecting children from the conduct of a convicted pe-
dophile, playing up Doe’s status as a sex offender122 while, conversely, 
  
arguing that, because speech and press freedoms were mentioned explicitly, only those strict forms of 
expression were protected”). 
 117. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 778. 
 118. Id. at 776 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 783. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 767 (majority) (The majority wrote, for instance, that “Mr. Doe is an admitted sexual 
addict with a proclivity toward children; as such, he belongs to a group of persons who are more sus-
ceptible to having sexual desires with respect to children and to acting on those urges.  We cannot 
ignore, nor can we say the law somehow commands the City to ignore, Mr. Doe’s pedophilia and the 
history of his battle with that affliction.  Facing this reality certainly does not license society, acting 
through government, to exile, harass or marginalize Mr. Doe, but it permits government to fulfill its 
responsibility to protect vulnerable children in dangerous situations.”) (emphasis in original). 
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eliminating from that framing any constitutional concerns about the free-
dom of thought and First Amendment scrutiny.123  As the majority wrote: 
The First Amendment does not prohibit the City from taking the 
action it did to protect its children.  It does not require the City to 
act in an ostrichlike fashion and expose the children of the City to 
the risk that, on a future date, a child will wander further from the 
group, present a better opportunity and experience the tragic con-
sequences.124 
The majority posed twin hypothetical, what-if questions that focused 
on the danger to children, not the danger to constitutional rights.  The ma-
jority asked, “[w]hat if there were only one child there that evening?  
Would Mr. Doe have succumbed to his urges and considered the opportu-
nity more ‘realistic’?”125  It is somewhat striking and disturbing that a fed-
eral appellate court would seem to be justifying its decision, at least in 
some small part, on a set of hypothetical questions and fact patterns not 
before it, guessing what may or may not have happened.  It was as if the 
majority was acting more like a law professor tweaking a hypothetical in 
front of a class than like a court bound by the facts before it. 
Yet the majority tipped its hand, revealing that the case was not about 
any conduct that actually occurred, when it wrote that “Mr. Doe brought 
himself to the brink.”126  That statement begs the question: The brink of 
what?  The answer is obvious – the brink of criminal conduct.  And the fact 
is that Doe never engaged in criminal conduct; he never traversed and 
crossed the chasm that divided thought from action while in Murdock Park 
that night in January 2000. 
In contrast to the majority’s conduct-centric framing of the issues, the 
dissent wrote that the case raised a trio of freedom-of-thought based ques-
tions: 
May a city constitutionally ban one of its citizens from public 
property based on its discovery of that individual’s immoral 
thoughts?  Is being banned from public property a ‘punishment’?  
Does the First Amendment protect a citizen’s right to think about 
  
 123. The First Amendment issue of freedom of thought was eliminated, for the majority, because of 
its claim that First Amendment scrutiny was only applicable to “pure thought” cases.  See supra nn. 
109-10 and accompanying text. 
 124. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767. 
 125. Id. at 762. 
 126. Id. at 762 (emphasis added). 
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committing a crime, even if he has committed that crime in the 
past?127 
The answers to these questions for the dissent were, in the order asked 
above:  no, yes, and yes.  More simply put, the dissenting judges concluded 
that “the City of Lafayette may not punish Doe for his thinking alone, for 
without protection from government intrusion into our thoughts, the free-
doms guaranteed by the First Amendment are virtually meaningless.”128 
C. Four First Amendment-Based Reasons Why the Majority Got it Wrong 
The freedoms of thought and speech are inextricably linked.  John Stu-
art Mill wrote, nearly 150 years ago in On Liberty about “the liberty of 
thought, from which it is impossible to separate the cognate liberty of 
speaking and of writing.”129  Far more recently, Rodney Smolla wrote that, 
“[t]he linkage of speech to thought, to man’s central capacity to reason and 
wonder, is what places speech above other forms of fulfillment, and be-
yond the routine jurisdiction of the state.”130  But one does not need the 
words of a law school dean or prominent First Amendment scholar to ap-
preciate this fact.  The well-worn cliché “think before you speak”131 tells us 
that much.  Ironically, of course, John Doe did think before he spoke – he 
just never should have spoken up about his thoughts.  John Doe’s case 
aside, it is clear that thought should be a prerequisite for expression. 
Given this close connection between thought and speech, as well as the 
fact that the freedom of each is covered by the same constitutional amend-
ment, it is reasonable to attempt to understand, using principles derived 
from free expression jurisprudence, why the majority of the Seventh Cir-
cuit erred in ruling against John Doe on the issue of freedom of thought.  
The reasons set forth below are either in addition to or significantly expand 
upon those of the dissent in Doe v. City of Lafayette.  They provide, then, a 
different rationale for understanding the flaws with the majority’s logic and 
conclusion. 
  
 127. Id. at 776 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 128. Id. at 785. 
 129. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 18 (Currin V. Shields ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1956) (originally 
published 1859). 
 130. Smolla, supra n. 41, at 10. 
 131. The phrase is usually used when a person says something stupid that gets that person into trou-
ble.  See Phyllis Stark et al., Disco, Davidians, and Diatribes: The Dubious Distinction Awards, Bill-
board 97 (Dec. 25, 1993) (giving out a “Think Before You Speak Award” to a program director at a 
rock music radio station who “practically fired himself” at a National Association of Broadcasters 
meeting when he said, “There has to be that one guy at your station who lives and breathes the music.  
Now I’m not that guy, and if that guy isn’t your program director, you should fire him.”). 
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1. The Seventh Circuit’s Flawed New Doctrine of “Pure Thought” 
In holding that John Doe’s case was not subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny, the majority of the Seventh Circuit wrote that “[t]he First 
Amendment’s freedom of mind principle does not subject every conduct-
focused regulation to First Amendment scrutiny; rather, it only prohibits 
those regulations aimed at pure thought and thus mind control.”132  For the 
majority, “a government entity no doubt runs afoul of the First Amendment 
when it punishes an individual for pure thought.”133  Why restrict First 
Amendment protection of the right to think to pure thoughts only, rather 
than applying it to situations in which there is a combination or hybrid of 
thought and action?  The majority simply reasoned that “[l]imiting First 
Amendment protection to pure thought is rooted in common sense.”134 
In fact, while the majority relies heavily on the doctrine of “pure 
thought”–it uses that phrase, moreover, six different times across a span of 
only three pages135–it is a brand-new doctrine, its own invention that is not 
grounded on precedent.  An online, keyword search of all United States 
Supreme Court opinions for all dates reveals that there is not a single case 
that includes the phrase “pure thought.”136  There are, then, no Supreme 
Court opinions containing both “pure thought” and “First Amendment.”  
At the federal appellate court level, there are only four opinions (other than 
the initial137 and en banc138 rulings in Doe v. City of Lafayette) ever written 
that include the phrase “pure thought.”139  None of those opinions were 
from the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.140 
  
 132. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 765 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. (emphasis added). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 765-67. 
 136. To conduct this research, the author of this article, on September 17, 2004, used the “Legal 
Research” section of the LexisNexis® Academic online database, searching under “Federal Case Law” 
for “Supreme Court Cases” for all available dates.  The “keyword” search was for the phrase “pure 
thought.”  The online database is available to subscribers at http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/form    
/academic/legalresearch.html (last visited for purposes of this specific search on Apr. 23, 2005). 
 137. Doe, 334 F.3d 606, vacated and reh’g granted, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16563 (7th Cir. Aug. 8, 
2003). 
 138. 377 F.3d 757. 
 139. See U.S. v. Ragsdale, 438 F.2d 21, 26 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 919 (1971) (using 
the phrase “pure thoughts” only one time in the context of the sentence “[n]oble motives and pure 
thoughts cannot bar the conviction of one who admits intentional action which violates the proscrip-
tions of a statute declaring that action criminal, and a judge can properly instruct as to what acts the 
statute condemns, which is the most the instructions did here”); U.S. v. Howard, 504 F.2d 1281, 1284 
(8th Cir. 1974) (using the phrase “pure thoughts” only one time and quoting it in the context from 
another case, “Noble motives and pure thoughts cannot bar the conviction of one who admits inten-
tional action which violates the proscriptions of a statute declaring that action criminal”) (citing 
Ragsdale, 438 F.2d at 26); Winter v. G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1991) (using 
the phrase “pure thought” only one time, in context of a case in which an individual sued the publisher 
of a book on mushrooms, in support of the proposition that a “’How to Use’ book is pure thought and 
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In fact, the Seventh Circuit’s pure thought doctrine–a doctrine under 
which no First Amendment scrutiny is applied in a case if there is any 
combination or mixture of thoughts with conduct–directly conflicts with 
fundamental principles of First Amendment free expression jurisprudence.  
In particular, the United States Supreme Court has recognized and clearly 
established that when speech and conduct are combined, First Amendment 
scrutiny does apply.  Thus the conduct of flag burning may involve and 
combine with such expressive elements that it is said to constitute speech 
protected by the First Amendment.141  Under the Court’s symbolic speech 
doctrine “conduct is analyzed as speech under the First Amendment if, 
first, there is the intent to convey a specific message and, there is a sub-
stantial likelihood that the message would be understood by those receiv-
ing it.”142 
If conduct can mix with expressive elements and be subjected to First 
Amendment scrutiny, then why shouldn’t conduct be able to mix with ele-
ments of thought and imagination and also be subjected to First Amend-
ment scrutiny?  Neither the majority nor the dissent addressed the symbolic 
speech doctrine or this paradox. 
Furthermore, it is clear that the thoughts involved in Doe v. City of La-
fayette are not merely de minimis, incidental, or tangential to conduct.  It 
was the thoughts of John Doe that initially caused him to drive to Murdock 
Park and, once there, it was only his thoughts, when later translated to 
speech at a therapy session, that landed Doe in trouble, as he engaged in no 
conduct while at the park (unless the majority considered sitting conduct, 
something which even it did not have the moxie to assert).  Anyone can 
drive to a park and sit on a bench in Forrest Gump-like fashion.143  What 
made Doe different from some latter-day Gump was the perverted thoughts 
that ran through his head.144 
  
expression”); Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 698 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (using the phrase “pure thought” only 
one time in the context of a case involving a former Navy midshipman who admitted to being a homo-
sexual constitutionality of the regulations pursuant to which he was discharged from the Naval Acad-
emy). 
 140. See supra n. 139 (identifying the appellate courts in question that have used the phrase “pure 
thought”). 
 141. See Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that the conviction, under a Texas law, of 
Gregory Lee Johnson for publicly burning an American flag in 1984 near the Republican National 
Convention as a sign of political protest violated his First Amendment right of free speech). 
 142. Chemerinsky, supra n. 48, at 1027. 
 143. See Eleanor Ringel, Movies; Review; “Mamma Roma,” Atlanta J. & Const. 8P (May 19, 1995) 
(describing “Forrest Gump on his park bench”). 
 144. While the fictional Gump benignly pondered his box of chocolates, Doe deviously pondered 
pedophilic desires.  See Maria Laurino, A New Breed of Hero, Houston Chron. 10 (July 4, 1994) (de-
scribing how the character Forrest Gump “sits squarely on a park bench in a starched cream suit, his 
shirt buttoned to the collar, holding a box of chocolates”). 
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In a weak attempt to support its newly minted pure thought doctrine, 
the majority in City of Lafayette cited the United States Supreme Court’s 
opinion in the child pornography possession case of Osborne v. Ohio.145  
The majority of the Seventh Circuit wrote: 
In rejecting Osborne’s First Amendment arguments, the Court dis-
tinguished its freedom of thought precedent: The difference here is 
obvious: The State does not rely on a paternalistic interest in regu-
lating Osborne’s mind. Rather, Ohio has enacted § 2907.323(A)(3) 
in order to protect the victims of child pornography; it hopes to de-
stroy a market for the exploitative use of children.146 
The difference between the two cases is clear; real children are harmed 
when child pornography is created.  No real children, however, were 
harmed by John Doe in Murdock Park in January of 2000.  Osborne’s con-
sideration of freedom of thought thus is readily distinguished from the is-
sue and facts in City of Lafayette. 
2. Viewpoint-Based Discrimination on Thought and Expression 
Justice William Brennan, a staunch supporter of First Amendment 
rights,147 once wrote that “viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its 
purest form.”148  It is a point that courts have re-affirmed over the years.  
For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
wrote in 2004 that the First Amendment provides a right “to be free of 
viewpoint-based discrimination and punishment”149 and that “one of the 
most egregious types of First Amendment violations is viewpoint-based 
discrimination.”150  The government should remain neutral as to viewpoints 
on particular issues when it regulates expression.151  The prohibition 
against viewpoint-based regulations represents “a fundamental First 
Amendment principle – that government may not proscribe speech or ex-
pressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed.”152  For 
  
 145. 495 U.S. 103 (1990). 
 146. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 776 (quoting Osborne, 495 U.S. at 109). 
 147. See generally Robert D. Richards, Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide Open: Mr. Justice Brennan’s 
Legacy to the First Amendment (Parkway Publishers 1994) (detailing Brennan’s contributions to free 
speech jurisprudence). 
 148. Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). 
 149. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 150. Id. at 1279. 
 151. See generally Esperanza Peace & Just. Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433, 444-45 
(W.D. Tex. 2001) (discussing “[t]he prohibition against viewpoint discrimination, and the requirement 
of its converse, viewpoint neutrality”). 
 152. Id. at 444. 
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instance, the government could not permissibly regulate only pro-life 
speech on the topic of abortion but allow pro-choice speech on the same 
topic to go unfettered. 
Academics concur with this assessment.  For instance, former Stanford 
Law School Dean Kathleen M. Sullivan and the late constitutional law 
professor Gerald Gunther have written that “[t]he Court generally treats 
restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm 
violation of the First Amendment.”153 
If viewpoint-based regulation of expression is prohibited, then, by im-
plication and analogy in First Amendment jurisprudence, viewpoint-based 
regulation of thought, the precursor to expression, must also be prohibited.  
Yet the majority’s opinion in City of Lafayette represents the ultimate in 
viewpoint-based discrimination.  Why?  Because, on the topic of children 
and how one should think about them, Doe was punished precisely because 
of his pedophilic viewpoint – precisely because he viewed, in his mind, 
children as sex objects for his desire, gratification and satisfaction.  In 
comparison, had John Doe gone to Murdock Park and harbored what most 
would consider to be positive, non-pedophilic thoughts about children, the 
City of Lafayette would not have taken action against him and, further-
more, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals never would have heard of this 
particular John Doe.  For instance, if Doe had sat on a bench in the park 
and thought to himself, “those children have so much energy and great 
futures ahead of them.  I wish them the best of luck in school and in their 
rest of their lives,” then nothing would have happened to him.  It was only 
because of Doe’s deviant viewpoint on the topic of children that he was 
banned from Lafayette’s parks. 
As a general principle, then, the majority’s opinion in City of Lafayette 
embodies and embraces viewpoint-based discrimination on a person’s 
thoughts.  For the appellate court, one may freely possess “good” thoughts 
about a topic like children, but one cannot have “bad” thoughts about that 
same subject matter.  The decision thus flies in the face of established First 
Amendment jurisprudence in the area of free speech and it begs for rever-
sal by the United States Supreme Court. 
3. Free Speech Theory Applied: The Marketplace of Ideas & Self-
Realization 
Two important and well-established theories about the importance of 
free speech–the marketplace of ideas and self-realization/self-fulfillment–
support and provide rationales for John Doe’s right to freedom thought.  
  
 153. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, First Amendment Law 212 (2d ed., Found. Press 2003). 
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Neither theory was mentioned by either the majority or the dissent in City 
of Lafayette, but each provides an important justification for the protection 
of Doe’s thoughts, given the proximity between thought and speech.  
Those justifications are described below. 
a. Marketplace of Ideas 
The marketplace of ideas theory for protecting expression “represents 
one of the most powerful images of free speech, both for legal thinkers and 
for laypersons,”154 and it “is perhaps the most powerful metaphor in the 
free speech tradition.”155  Professor Martin Redish observes that “over the 
years, it has not been uncommon for scholars or jurists to analogize the 
right of free expression to a marketplace in which contrasting ideas com-
pete for acceptance among a consuming public.”156  The metaphor is used 
frequently today.157  More than seventy-five years after it first became a 
part of First Amendment jurisprudence with Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s often-quoted admonition that “the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market.”158  As Holmes’ quotation suggests, the theory embodies what 
Professor Daniel Farber calls “the truth-seeking rationale for free expres-
sion.”159 
The premises and goals of the marketplace of ideas theory of free 
speech, when applied to freedom of thought, support John Doe’s case and 
the need for reversal of the majority’s opinion.  First, the theory is logically 
borrowed from the realm of speech because “ideas” are, after all, thoughts; 
one could easily substitute the phrase “marketplace of thoughts” for “mar-
ketplace of ideas.”  It is only the use and engagement of speech that trans-
forms private thoughts into a public marketplace of ideas in which one’s 
thoughts–one’s ideas–compete against those of other individuals. 
John Stuart Mill, the philosopher closely associated with the market-
place of ideas theory,160 recognized the importance of protecting thought, 
observing that an individual is sovereign over his own mind.161  Mill wrote 
  
 154. Matthew D. Bunker, Critiquing Free Speech: First Amendment Theory and the Challenge of 
Interdisciplinarity 2 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assocs. 2001). 
 155. Smolla, supra n. 41, at 6. 
 156. Martin H. Redish & Kirk J. Kaludis, The Right of Expressive Access in First Amendment The-
ory: Redistributive Values and the Democratic Dilemma, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1083 (1999). 
 157. See e.g. Va. v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (describing an “uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas”). 
 158. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 159. Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 4 (2d ed. Found. Press 2003). 
 160. See Bunker, supra n. 154, at 3 (writing that “[m]arketplace theory grew in sophistication as a 
result of British philosopher John Stuart Mill’s 1959 defense of free speech in ‘On Liberty’ ”). 
 161. Mill, supra n. 129, at 13. 
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in On Liberty that the region of human liberty includes “the inward domain 
of consciousness, demanding liberty of conscience in the most comprehen-
sive sense, liberty of thought and feeling.”162  Ultimately, it was John 
Doe’s conscience that moved him voluntarily to leave Murdock Park, 
without harming anyone, and to seek help from his psychologist. 
Second, “the core insight of marketplace theory–fallibilism–leads us to 
exercise great caution before silencing viewpoints with which we dis-
agree.”163  Both the majority and dissent in City of Lafayette disagreed with 
the viewpoint of John Doe on children, as would almost anyone, yet the 
marketplace metaphor serves “as a stabilizing force against”164 the urge to 
censor such viewpoints.  Under the marketplace theory, Doe is allowed to 
hold his viewpoint (in this case, it initially was an internal viewpoint that 
was only later expressed at his therapy session) and the proper remedy for 
it is counterspeech,165 not censorship.  At the heart of the counterspeech 
doctrine is the idea, as Justice Louis Brandeis once wrote, “[i]f there be 
time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the 
evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more 
speech, not enforced silence.”166 
Doe, in fact, went to his group therapy session–a mini-marketplace of 
ideas, as it were–to seek help and correction for his deviant ideas.  The 
speech of the other members of the group would serve as counterspeech.  
But, ultimately, John Doe was punished for this action and for his speech, 
if one believes his assertion that it probably was someone from that group 
who told his former probation officer about his views about children while 
in Murdock Park.167  Ironically, had Doe engaged in self-censorship–had 
he chosen not to speak up in this marketplace of ideas and, instead, exer-
cised his right not to speak–he would not have been punished.  But self-
censorship and silence does not make “bad” thoughts go way; it only 
drives them underground, as it were, where they may fester and breed lar-
ger problems later.  Thus, the idea in First Amendment jurisprudence that 
free speech serves as a “safety valve”168 preventing trouble is relevant here 
  
 162. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 163. Bunker, supra n. 154, at 8. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See generally Robert D. Richards & Clay Calvert, Counterspeech 2000: A New Look at the Old 
Remedy for “Bad” Speech, 2000 BYU L. Rev. 553 (2000) (analyzing the counterspeech doctrine and 
providing some relatively recent examples of its application in free speech controversies). 
 166. Whitney v. Ca, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
 167. Supra n. 99 and accompanying text. 
 168. Farber, supra n. 159, at 6. 
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as well.169  Had Doe not expressed his feelings in an effort to cure his urges 
and impulses, his problems might have built up. 
The marketplace of ideas metaphor also supports Doe in another way.  
In particular, it should be the worth of the idea–the quality of the thought–
that matters most in the competition of ideas, not the character of individ-
ual behind the idea.  Put differently, it is the quality of the idea, not the 
quality of the individual thinker behind it, that is pivotal.  Justice Holmes 
thus focused on “the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the com-
petition of the market,”170 not the power or lack thereof of the individual 
behind the thought. 
It seems clear that John Doe’s thoughts, once expressed and discussed, 
should not be “accepted” in the competition of the market but rather driven 
out from it.  However, the problem, from a marketplace of ideas perspec-
tive, is that the majority of the Seventh Circuit placed far too much empha-
sis on the quality of the man behind the thought.  For instance, the majority 
wrote: 
We cannot ignore, nor can we say the law somehow commands the 
City to ignore, Mr. Doe’s pedophilia and the history of his battle 
with that affliction.  Facing this reality certainly does not license 
society, acting through government, to exile, harass or marginalize 
Mr. Doe, but it permits government to fulfill its responsibility to 
protect vulnerable children in dangerous situations.171 
Dissenting Judge Williams recognized the majority’s over-emphasis, if 
not reliance, in its reasoning on the character of the person behind the 
thought.  She wrote that the “only factors that differentiate Doe from others 
are that the City was apprised of his thoughts while he was in the park and 
its knowledge of his past conduct.”172  Doe’s First Amendment right of free 
thought should not be reduced in importance because of what he has done 
in the past.  As Judge Williams wrote, it is an “axiomatic principle” that 
punishment of a person for his or her status is “impermissible under the 
Eighth Amendment.”173  And while the First Amendment rights of prison-
ers in jail are not coextensive with those of individuals on the other side of 
  
 169. See generally Kent R. Middleton et al., The Law of Public Communication, 30 (Allyn & Bacon 
2004) (“Free expression can act as a safety valve, allowing critics to participate in change rather than 
seek influence through antisocial acts.”). 
 170. Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 171. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 767. 
 172. Id. at 779 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 782.  The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[e]xcessive 
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”  
U.S. Const. amend VIII. 
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the bars,174 Doe was no longer in prison or on probation.  He was a free 
man who had served his time. 
b. Self-Realization/Self-Fulfillment 
A second rationale or theory for protection of free speech is self-
realization and self-fulfillment of the individual, regardless of whether 
some larger truth is discovered in the marketplace of ideas.  In this theory, 
free speech is privileged as “an end in itself, an end intimately entwined 
with human autonomy and dignity.”175  As Smolla writes, the “freedom to 
speak without restraint provides the speaker with an inner satisfaction and 
realization of self-identity essential to individual fulfillment.”176  Bunker 
notes that under this theory, which he dubs individual autonomy, 
“[f]reedom of speech contributes to individuals’ opportunities to develop 
their rational faculties and to make critical decisions about the pursuit of a 
good life.”177 
The last line above is italicized for a particular reason.  Why?  Because 
it was through the freedom of thought, that John Doe made critical deci-
sions about the pursuit of a good life.  In the internal struggle in his own 
mind that went on that January day in 2000 in Murdock Park, Doe made 
the right decision – he decided to leave and to call his psychologist.  He 
decided that his own identity would not–at least not on that occasion–be 
that of a child molester, but rather one of a person seeking to gain control 
over his own life through his thoughts, his speech and, subsequently, his 
behavior. 
If the theory of self-realization is tied to human dignity and autonomy 
interests,178 then Doe should be rewarded, not punished because his 
autonomous decision-making process ultimately resulted in Doe keeping 
his behavioral impulses in check.  It violates the principle of human dignity 
to punish Doe when, ultimately, he made the dignified decision to leave 
and to seek further treatment.  Significantly, in an interview in 2004 with a 
reporter from a local newspaper, Doe pondered why he went to the park in 
the first place, stating “[t]he only thing I can come up with was that it was 
  
 174. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (adopting a lesser standard of scrutiny to apply to 
restrictions on the speech rights prisoners; writing that “when a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ 
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
ests”; and reasoning that “[s]ubjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible 
strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt 
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration”). 
 175. Smolla, supra n. 41, at 9. 
 176. Id. (emphasis added). 
 177. Bunker, supra n. 154, at 12 (emphasis added). 
 178. Bellah, supra n. 43 and accompanying text. 
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maybe a test.  Just to see if, being ‘free,’ if I’d continue to act the way I 
had under probation and house arrest.”179  Doe thinks that he passed that 
mental test,180 and his psychologist “focused on the fact that Doe was able 
to control his urge and leave the park as a positive step in his rehabilita-
tion.”181 
Doe was able, then, in this private mind game to take a metaphorical 
mental eraser, as it were, to his deviant thoughts and to keep them in check 
with different thoughts – thoughts about the better person that he longed 
and desired to be.  That, after all, surely explains why he immediately 
called his psychologist after leaving the park to tell her about what had just 
taken place.  As Doe stated during a deposition in the case, “I recognized 
that these were just unhealthy thoughts and I realized I needed to leave the 
park, which is what I did.”182  In brief, the First Amendment theory of self-
realization through speech, when extended to apply to self-realization 
through thought–thought being the requisite precursor to speech–militates 
in favor protecting John Doe and reversing his ban from Lafayette’s public 
parks. 
4. Offensive Ideas, Not Just Offensive Images 
Judge Williams’ dissent does an excellent job in emphasizing the Su-
preme Court’s recognition in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,183 de-
scribed above in Part I, that fake images of minors engaged in sexual con-
duct cannot be banned simply because of the mental gymnastics and 
thought processes of pedophiles that transform them into sexual stimuli 
that may lead to deviant conduct.  She writes that the Court held that “the 
fact that possession of virtual child pornography may ignite sexually im-
moral thoughts about children was not enough to justify banning it.”184  
Likewise, she notes the Court’s rejection in Free Speech Coalition of the 
federal government’s argument that the images can be banned because 
those thought processes may lead to criminal conduct.185  As Justice Ken-
nedy wrote for the majority of the high court: 
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the govern-
ment seeks to control thought or to justify its laws for that imper-
missible end.  The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and 
  
 179. Gerrety, supra n. 83. 
 180. Id. 
 181. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 775 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 182. Id. at 774. 
 183. 535 U.S. 234. 
 184. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 777 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 185. Id. at 778-79. 
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speech must be protected from the government because speech is 
the beginning of thought.186 
While Judge Williams correctly focuses on this language and Free 
Speech Coalition’s protection of offensive imagery of computer-generated 
children, it is important to point out another area left unaddressed by the 
dissent involving offensive expression that also supports Doe’s case.  In 
particular, Free Speech Coalition dealt with offensive images and how 
those images were mentally mapped in minds of pedophiles.  But Doe’s 
case does not revolve around offensive images that he examined; rather, it 
pivots on the offensive ideas in his head about allegedly procuring and 
plotting to seduce children in a park.  As Doe admitted:  
[M]y thoughts were . . . [to] possibly expose myself to them . . . 
[and] having some kind of sexual contact with the kids, but I know 
with four kids there, that’s pretty difficult to do.  It’s a wide open 
area.  Those thoughts . . . weren’t realistic at the time.187 
The case thus centers as much on offensive ideas of seduction of chil-
dren as it does about fantasized offensive images of actual molestation.  
The case must be made, then, that offensive ideas–not just offensive im-
ages–are protected by the freedom of thought. 
To this extent, it is somewhat surprising that the dissent in City of La-
fayette failed to seize upon the United States Supreme Court’s supportive 
language in Texas v. Johnson.188  In particular, Justice William J. Brennan 
wrote that “[i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amend-
ment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea 
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”189  If 
the expression of an offensive idea is protected by the First Amendment, 
then surely the idea itself must also be protected, regardless of whether it 
ever is transformed into written, spoken or symbolic expression.  Thus, 
while Doe’s thoughts clearly were offensive, they nonetheless would be 
protected under the precedent of Texas v. Johnson extended into the realm 
of thought. 
Doe’s thoughts and fantasies in the park dealt with a sexual taboo – sex 
between adults and children.  Interestingly, the United States Supreme 
Court has protected offensive imaginative expression relating to a similar 
sexual taboo – incest.  In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,190 the Court held 
  
 186. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 253. 
 187. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d at 760. 
 188. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 189. Id. at 414 (emphasis added). 
 190. 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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that the First Amendment protected a sexual explicit magazine’s imagina-
tive message that a well-respected religious figure engaged in “a drunken 
incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an outhouse.”191  The Court, in 
support of its decision, cited an earlier opinion for the following proposi-
tion: 
The fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient 
reason for suppressing it.  Indeed, if it is the speaker’s opinion that 
gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it consti-
tutional protection.  For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment 
that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of 
ideas.192 
This language thus bridges principles of protection for offensive 
speech with the theory of the marketplace of ideas described earlier.193  If 
offensive expression is protected, then surely offensive thought is pro-
tected.  After all, absent some kind of thought police that are able to get 
inside our heads to read our minds, offensive thought must manifest itself 
in the form of speech in order for it to be known.  No one would have 
known the offensive thoughts of John Doe in Murdock Park had he not 
transformed those thoughts into speech conveyed to his psychologist and 
therapy group. 
In summary, there are multiple reasons why, from a First Amendment 
perspective, John Doe’s thoughts, however offensive or deviant they might 
have been, deserve protection against government action and retribution.  
The next part of this article examines the possible ramifications of the ma-
jority’s holding in City of Lafayette should other courts adopt its analysis in 
future cases. 
IV.  CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITIES: THE THOUGHT BUBBLES ABOVE 
OUR HEADS 
In an August 2004 editorial that generally lauded the majority opinion 
of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in City of Lafayette, the staff of the 
Lafayette Journal & Courier nonetheless posed an interesting and caution-
ary question to its readers: “[i]f thoughts were visible, as balloons hovering 
over the heads of cartoon characters, imagine the graphic stories being told 
through the park, through the mall or through any public area.  How many 
  
 191. Id. at 48. 
 192. Id. at 55-56 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U. S. 726, 745-46 (1978)). 
 193. Supra nn. 153-74 and accompanying text. 
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more would be booted from city parks as a precaution?”194  The newspa-
per’s answer to its own query–“[m]ore than we might think, unfortu-
nately”195–reveals the fundamental trouble with the Seventh Circuit’s opin-
ion. 
In particular, who among us has not, at some point, harbored a thought 
about committing crime and then, like John Doe, thought twice and not 
acted it out?  As a divorced colleague of the author at The Pennsylvania 
State University half-jokingly remarked when told about the majority opin-
ion in City of Lafayette, “I suspect there’d be an awful lot of ex-spouses 
out there doing hard time.” 
The hypotheticals at the start of this article help to illustrate other prob-
lems with both the feasibility and workability of the Seventh Circuit’s ap-
proach in City of Lafayette as applied to other situations.  In particular, 
they highlight three key factors or variables in the appellate court’s deci-
sion-making process that remain vague and undefined in their future appli-
cations.  Those variables are: 
• Distance: How close must one be, in terms of physical distance and 
proximity, from the object(s) or target(s) of the criminal activity about 
which one thinks before one can be punished for the thoughts? 
• Conduct: How much conduct on the part of the thinker, as it were, is 
necessary under the Seventh Circuit’s new pure-thought doctrine196 before 
one is stripped of any First Amendment protection for freedom of thought? 
• Prior Conduct: How much emphasis is placed on the past bad acts– 
the prior criminal conduct–of the thinker in determining whether thoughts 
may be punished or accounted for by governmental entities when it comes 
to banning or prohibiting individuals from entering specific locations? 
With regard to the issue of physical distance and proximity, it was im-
portant for the Seventh Circuit that John Doe drove to a park where he had 
ready and easy access to the targets, in this case children, of his deviant 
thoughts.  How would this be applied to the first hypothetical in which a 
man who harbors the thought of assassinating the President of the United 
States is close enough to see George W. Bush as he steps out of his car 
near Madison Square Garden?  How would it apply to the high school stu-
dent in the second hypothetical who fantasizes about killing his classmates 
while he plays a video game in an arcade located just one block from his 
school?  Would it matter how long that block is? 
  
 194. A Victory for Parents, Parks in ‘John Doe’ Case, J. & Courier (Lafayette, Ind.) 5A (Aug. 2, 
2004). 
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra nn. 132-40 and accompanying text (describing the pure thought doctrine created by 
the majority in City of Lafayette). 
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As to the second variable–conduct–precisely how many steps and ac-
tions are necessary on the part of the thinker before the notion of freedom 
of thought is left by the wayside under the appellate court’s new-fangled 
pure thought doctrine?  For the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, it was 
John Doe’s conduct of driving a car to a location where children were pre-
sent that was sufficient to allow the majority not to apply First Amendment 
scrutiny.  Is there sufficient conduct in the first scenario on the part of the 
actor to similarly lead a court to conclude that First Amendment scrutiny is 
irrelevant?  Is the act of attendance at an angry and heated political rally 
such sufficient conduct?  Is the mere act of standing enough conduct to 
waive, as it were, First Amendment protection for freedom of thought?  
What about the high school boy in the second scenario?  Is the act of play-
ing a video game–something that some people believe causes violence and 
aggression among teens–sufficient action to eliminate First Amendment 
protection for the violent fantasies in his head?  Or is the act of walking to 
the video arcade, much like Doe drove to a park, sufficient conduct to 
scrap protection of thought?  What if the student had walked to the school 
grounds immediately after playing the video game, while he was still hav-
ing fantasies about shooting his classmates? 
Finally, as to the third variable–prior bad acts on the part of thinker–
how much weight does one give in the first scenario to the fact that the 
individual at the anti-Bush rally recently completed a prison term for the 
crime of assault with a deadly weapon?  As noted earlier, the majority of 
the Seventh Circuit emphasized in its reasoning John Doe’s long criminal 
record of sexual deviance.  How extensive, then, must one’s record be be-
fore a city or municipality is justified in banning an individual from a po-
litical rally in a park?  How recent must the last prior conviction have been 
in time to the bad thoughts which trigger action against him?  What if a 
person has no prior convictions or has never before engaged in the criminal 
activity about which he thinks but then, later, mentally recants?  Would it 
make a difference in the second scenario if a fact was added that the high 
school student once was arrested and convicted for animal cruelty for 
shooting his neighbors’ cats? 
These questions are left unanswered here precisely because the Sev-
enth Circuit’s reasoning is such that it leaves plenty of wiggle room and 
legal leeway for possibility and speculation.  The case of John Doe clearly 
tests our limits on the freedom of thought because it deals with taboos–sex 
between adults and children–that are among the most reprehensible and 
reviled of crimes in the United States.  But the assassination of a president 
is similarly tragic and reviled, as are school shootings in which innocent 
young lives are lost because of seemingly senseless violence.  Would they 
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be treated similarly?  Only time and future cases will provide the answers 
to this and the other questions raised above. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The seventeenth-century French philosopher Rene Descartes famously 
proclaimed “cogito ergo sum,” which translates to English as “I think, 
therefore I am.”197  After the Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Doe v. City of 
Lafayette, it seems like it is not too much of a stretch to rephrase that quo-
tation to read, “I think criminal thoughts, therefore I am a criminal.” 
Although John Doe had a criminal record, he was free when he har-
bored his criminal thoughts.  It was a violation of his First Amendment 
right to freedom of thought to ban him, because of his internal mind games 
and deviant ideas, from Murdock Park and other venues in the City of La-
fayette.  This article has suggested multiple reasons, in both Parts II and 
III, why the majority of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals reached the 
wrong conclusion in its July 2004 decision.  The reasons suggested here go 
far beyond those identified by the three dissenting judges in the case.  The 
two fictitious scenarios set forth at the start of this article further help to 
illustrate problems with the majority’s conclusion. 
The philosopher Voltaire wrote that “the great consolation in life is to 
say what one thinks.”198  For John Doe, however, it was the great scourge 
of his life to say what he was thinking in a park one January day in 2000.  
Had he concealed his thoughts, had he not sought treatment from his psy-
chologist after he left the park, he never would have run afoul of the law, 
and we would never know about John Doe’s case.  Ultimately, then, Doe 
was punished for sharing his thoughts with others.  To not share one’s in-
ternal thoughts with others, no matter how bizarre or deviant they may be, 
not only contradicts the two theories of freedom of expression described in 
Part II, but it denies the very ability of one to be human through speech.  It 
is often said that hard cases make for bad law; in Doe’s case, it might be 
more appropriate to say that bad thoughts made for bad law. 
In summary, the Seventh Circuit majority’s logic and its reasoning in 
City of Lafayette are both misguided and dangerous.  Other courts must 
reject it and, instead, preserve and strengthen the constitutional right to 
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freedom of thought so recently trumpeted by the United States Supreme 
Court.199 
  
 199. See supra nn. 46-56 and accompanying text (setting forth recent pronouncements by the United 
States Supreme Court on freedom of thought). 
